

THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

PROFESSOR ROSS'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.¹

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Psychologists will welcome this volume by Professor Ross, who, though not technically of their number, has done brilliant work in establishing sociology upon the results of modern psychology, as his two former books on *Social Control* and *The Foundations of Sociology* abundantly testify. While Professor Ross's book is not the first systematic attempt to deal with the subject of social psychology, as he claims in his preface, since that honor, in English at least, undoubtedly belongs to Professor Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, yet it is a pioneer treatise and as such is extremely interesting and worthy of notice.

In hastily glancing over the book one is struck, first of all, by the fact that it is not laid out on conventional psychological lines. It does not begin with a summary of present knowledge concerning the psychology of the individual, but, after a brief introductory chapter on definitions, it opens with a chapter on suggestibility, followed by chapters on the crowd and mob mind, then by a series of chapters on conventional and customary imitation, and closing with a brief discussion of some aspects of social conflict and public opinion. If one expected that the psychology of human society would include a much wider range of topics than the above, the first impression made by the book would naturally be disappointing; and if one was familiar with the works of Tarde, a further impression would be that Professor Ross has confined himself almost entirely within the lines laid down by

¹*Social Psychology. An Outline and Source Book.* Edward Alsworth Ross, Professor of Sociology in the University of Wisconsin. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908. Pp. xvi + 372. \$1.50 net.

Tarde in his *Les Lois de l'Imitation* and other works. This latter impression is confirmed by the author in the preface where he acknowledges his immeasurable indebtedness to Tarde.

But it is not due to Tarde's influence alone that Professor Ross confines his social psychology largely to a consideration of the phenomena of suggestion and imitation, custom and convention. It is due even more to his conception of the subject. "Social psychology," he tells us,¹ "studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition which are due to the interaction of human beings." This definition necessarily excludes from social psychology the consideration of social variations and changes as such, social unlikeness and conflict not due to imitation, and as the author himself recognizes,² also those social uniformities due to instinct, innate racial character, and the influence of a common physical environment. On the other hand, since imitation is the chief means of propagating acquired uniformities in human society, as Baldwin has emphasized, Professor Ross is by his definition confined to a consideration of the social effects of the suggestion-imitation process.

The ambiguity in the use of the term 'social psychology,' as used both by psychologists and by sociologists, deserves attention. As has been elsewhere pointed out by the present writer,³ the term is used at present in two entirely distinct senses: first, to mean the psychology of the so-called social states of mind of the individual; secondly, to mean the psychology of the social life (interactions of individuals). Now in the first sense, social psychology is evidently a part of individual psychology, being concerned with a problem of immediate experience. In the second sense, it is equally evident that social psychology is but a name for the psychological aspect of sociology. There is, of course, no objection to using the term in this second sense, provided it is understood that such social psychology has the same problems as sociology, being, in fact, but a section of sociology. It is, indeed, but an application of psychology to the interpretation of the problems of the social life. Fully four fifths of all that is written to-day under the name of sociology is such a psychological interpretation of the social life. Only one densely ignorant, however, would claim that sociology and psychology have the same problems. While the dependence of

¹ P. 1.

² Pp. 2, 3.

³ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIII., pp. 336, 337.

sociology upon psychology is so great that it is properly classed as a 'mental science,' still it is evident that the sociologist in examining the origin, development, structure, and functions of the forms of the social life (interactions of individuals) is getting at something very different from what the psychologist is getting at. Social psychology in the first sense, then, and social psychology in the second sense are two very different things from the standpoint of scientific methodology.

Now Professor Ross does not use social psychology in the first sense; he says expressly in his *Foundations of Sociology*¹ that he regards social psychology as 'the lower story of sociology.' Yet he denies in the book under review that social psychology is but a name for the psychological aspect of sociology. He says² that social psychology differs from sociology proper in that it does not include the psychology of groups and social structures. The grouping of men through innate or acquired interests, the formation of social institutions to adjust those interests, are not, according to Professor Ross, phenomena to be dealt with by social psychology. "Social psychology considers men only as coming into planes or currents of uniformity, not as uniting into groups." The ground for this extraordinary division of labor between social psychology and 'sociology proper' we discover only when we consult again Ross's *Foundations of Sociology*.³ There we learn that the 'social' is what we get from our social environment through the influence of the example of others. In other words, Professor Ross practically adopts Tarde's views that 'the social is the imitated,' although he emphasizes the importance of 'contrary suggestion,' which Tarde also would probably not object to. A few sentences further on, however, Professor Ross inconsistently defines as 'social' "all phenomena which we cannot explain without bringing in the action of one human being on another." We say this is inconsistent, for the influence of one individual upon another surely cannot be reduced to imitation and contrary suggestion. Can communication, for example, which is preëminently a social phenomenon, be so reduced?

Upon the basis of such reasoning Professor Ross turns aside from the examination of the whole process of inter-stimulation among individuals and its effects upon social groupings, structures, and relations, and confines his attention to the suggestion-imitation process, that is, practically to conventional and customary imitation, as alone subject-matter for social psychology. The working of innate and acquired interests in shaping the groupings of men or in leading to conflicts;

¹ P. 8.

² P. 2.

³ Pp. 6, 7.

the expression of instincts and emotions in the interaction of individuals, often determining their relations; the breaking down of customs and conventions by changes in the life-conditions;—these and similar phenomena he practically ignores.

It seems to the reviewer that, in the long run, there can be but one judgment concerning Professor Ross's conception of social psychology; and that is, that it is wholly arbitrary. Social psychology, as a social science, can only mean an application of psychology to the interpretation of the social life. As such, its field is the whole realm of interstimulations among individuals, all social phenomena, in other words, in so far as they have a psychological aspect, not simply 'uniformities in feeling, belief or volition' due to conventional or customary imitation. It differs from 'sociology proper' only as the psychological aspect of that science differs from the whole.

This notice has been given up almost entirely to a criticism of Professor Ross's conception of social psychology, because that seems to the writer to be the vital point at issue, not only among sociologists, but also between sociologists and psychologists. As regards Professor Ross's handling of the problems with which he deals there is little fault to find, except that his point of view is dominantly non-functional. His standpoint is social habit, rather than social adaptation. This is again practically necessitated by his conception of his subject, which centers attention upon social uniformities rather than upon social changes. One cannot help wishing that Professor Ross had read to as good purpose the leaders in modern functional psychology as he has evidently read Tarde. Then we should have had a very different book. But as it stands, it is still one of the best studies of custom and convention in any language.

PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

MCDUGALL'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

An Introduction to Social Psychology. WILLIAM MCDUGALL.
London, Methuen & Co., 1908. Pp. x + 355.

Mr. McDougall attempts to present psychology from such a point of view that it may become a technique for the social sciences. The point of view which, in his opinion, will give this value to psychology is that of the instincts. The instinct the author defines as — “an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and, to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action” (p. 29). In this definition and in the discussion that leads up to it and follows it, there is implied the movement of nervous discharge along the afferent paths to the central portion of the nervous system from which the impulses go out to the vital organs and which are the nervous correlates of the conscious emotional experiences. From this central portion of the system also proceed the impulses to the motor tract that give rise to overt conduct or at least to tendencies to such conduct. This description of the instinct has considerable import for the theory of cognitive consciousness and for the theory of the emotion, and we will return to it later.

The author undertakes the difficult task of determining the instincts and their derivatives in the human animal, using three criteria (Chap. 3). These are the identity of a type of activity with one that is to be found in lower forms, the appearance of the activity as a dominant process in pathological cases, and the presence of a specific emotion which he assumes must accompany each instinct as such. The instincts and their corresponding emotions are flight and fear, repulsion and disgust, curiosity and wonder, pugnacity and anger, self-abasement (or subjection) and the emotion of subjection, self-assertion (or self-display) and elation (these two emotions may be called negative and positive self-feeling), the parental instinct and the tender emotion. There follow three instincts which the author conceives have no pro-

nounced emotional accompaniments — that of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, those of acquisition and construction.

The most important feature of this analysis of Mr. McDougall, in the mind of the reviewer, is that it makes the ultimate unit an act rather than a state of consciousness. All consciously formed habits are regarded as in a sense derivatives of these instincts and servants of them. All the motive power of conduct is found in them. All the complexities of thought and action are explained through the complications of the instincts and their stimuli and motor responses. The author recognizes two ways in which the instincts may be modified in themselves, apart from their combination with other instincts. The afferent processes with the accompanying sensuous experiences (the author conceives of these as necessarily perceptions) may be varied — either they may be modified by experience or new stimuli may be actually substituted for old ones; or the efferent processes, the motor phases of the act, may be modified — in the human form almost indefinitely, but slightly in the lower animal. The central part of the psycho-physical disposition, however, remains unchanged. Fear, anger, tenderness, as primitive characteristics of conscious experience are identical no matter what arouses them, or to what responses they give rise. The central phase of the act — the emotional — is subject to development only when a system of instincts or derivatives of instincts become organized about some object, when a sentiment arises. In so far as the sentiment is an affective experience it is a combination of different fundamental emotions. Its permanence and reference to certain objects, however, belong to the organization of these instinctive processes into highly complex and relatively permanent systems of conduct. In this treatment of sentiment and emotion Mr. McDougall follows with some innovations Shand, whose analysis of affective consciousness has been in large measure adopted by Stout as well.

The author's analysis of conduct into acts and of these acts into three constituents — afferent-perceptual, central-emotional, and efferent-motor, gives a convenient scheme for dealing with a number of psychological problems that are peculiarly social. He ranges suggestion, sympathy, and imitation as parallel modifications of perception, emotion and motor response, under social stimulation. Suggestion is the immediate acceptance of a presentation, idea, or belief similar to that of another. Sympathy is the induction of the emotion of another, while imitation implies the transfer of the motor response of one form to another. The mechanism of suggestion is quite inadequately discussed. The definition is as follows: "Suggestion is a process of

communication resulting in the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition, in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance" (p. 97). This evidently is with difficulty applicable to animals, among which suggestion is a recognized phenomenon, and the whole discussion is upon the conditions and degrees of suggestibility rather than upon the nature of suggestion. One feels that the author must be unacquainted with Wundt's classical brochure upon this subject.

In dealing with primitive sympathy — which is for him simply the induction of an emotion from one form to another, and is to be sharply distinguished from the higher social experience that is also called sympathy — Mr. McDougall suggests the possibility of the presence of other afferent paths to an instinctive process beside that which commonly excites it. In this way the motor phase of an instinct may excite the same emotion in another form. The one suffers with the other, because, *e. g.*, the instinct of flight with the emotion of fear may be aroused directly not only by the perception of a dangerous object, but also by the flight, or tendency to flight of another form.

Finally, imitation is discussed under three heads. Under the first, it is referred to the situation just described. The induction of emotion is frequently conceived of as imitation. In the second case the author simply falls back upon motor ideas: "In these cases the imitative movement seems to be due to the fact that the visual presentation of the movement of another is apt to evoke the representation of a similar movement of one's own body, which, like all motor representations, tends to realize itself immediately in movement" (p. 105). Finally the author refers to self-conscious imitation and its relation to admiration. In this same connection the author suggests a solution for the problem of 'playful fighting.' After criticizing other solutions, he assumes a modification of the instinct of fighting which has arisen and been preserved because of its value to the species. The most important phase of this conception of the author's is the derivation of rivalry as a phase of conduct from this modified instinct. "May it not be, then, that the impulse of rivalry is essentially this impulse to playful fighting, the impulse of an instinct differentiated from the combative instinct in the first instance in the animal world to secure practice in the movements of combat?" (p. 114).

Of considerable interest is the author's account of what he terms active sympathy — that state in which one desires that another shall share his emotion, and feels a certain satisfaction in this sharing, which enhances his pleasure and his joy. The explanation of this

arises in part from the primitive sympathy already discussed—the bare induction of the emotions. This however arouses disagreeable emotions as well as the agreeable, and leads to the avoidance of the source of these experiences while active sympathy finds satisfaction even in sharing the sorrow of another. The author finds his explanation for this paradox in the instinct of gregariousness. “The gregarious instinct supplements, as it were, each of the special instincts rendering complete satisfaction of their impulses impossible, until each animal is surrounded by others of the same species in a similar state of excitement. . . . The blind impulse of the gregarious animal to seek the company of his fellows, whenever one of his other instincts is excited, becomes in us the desire of seeing ourselves surrounded by others who share our emotions” (pp. 170, 171). It would be interesting to follow out the admirable analysis of complex sentiments into their constituent emotional parts, and the discussion of temperament and character. Enough has been given however to indicate that the author has an effective tool of analysis, which is peculiarly valuable in dealing with the phenomena of social consciousness.

In the discussion of the growth of self-consciousness (Chap. 7) the author undertakes to show in what manner individuals endowed with the instincts he has discussed attain the consciousness of self and become thereby moralized or socialized. The modification of the primitive impulses takes place (1) by pains and pleasures incidentally experienced; (2) by rewards and punishments more or less systematically administered by the social environment; (3) by experiences in which conduct is controlled by anticipations of social praise or blame; (4) by experiences “in which conduct is regulated by an ideal of conduct that enables a man to act in a way that seems to him right regardless of the praise or blame of his immediate social environment” (p. 181). The description of the earlier stage of development of self-consciousness does not differ materially from that of Baldwin and Royce. The further stages follow naturally from the previous discussion of the instincts, but what renders the account peculiar to the author is the gathering of the whole development about the self-regarding sentiment, which is built upon the instinct of self assertion. The different levels of social and moral consciousness are determined by the degree to which the other instincts with the social consciousness they involve can be organized under the self-regarding sentiment. The problem as stated by the author at the outset is that of developing an altruist out of an individual with egoistic impulses. In the last and much less considerable portion of the book the author makes use

of the different instincts as means of analysis and interpretation of social phenomena — especially in opposition to the analysis of a purely associational and hedonistic psychology. He offers, however, instances rather than a sociological doctrine.

The most disappointing chapter in the book to the reviewer has been that on development of self-consciousness. Though Mr. McDougall comes back specifically to the 'empirical me' and recognizes that the self can arise in consciousness only over against other selves, still the content of consciousness is generally treated as if these other selves existed as representations in the consciousness of the 'me.' There is no consistent psychological treatment of the development of the social consciousness as a whole within which the 'me' appears with no greater reality or immediacy than the *alieri*. The result is that the author places at the summit of his moral ladder the man who finally is able to retire into a noble but isolated self. The social character of morality is shabbily treated in the house of its friends.

Upon the psychological side there are two criticisms, in the opinion of the reviewer, which need especially to be made. One has to do with the relation of the cognitive, and the other with that of the emotional phase of the act to the instinct as a whole. The root of the difficulty is in both cases the same. Mr. McDougall assumes that the peculiar character of human reflective consciousness is due simply to the complication that arises through the freeing of ideas, the association and assimilation of these to each other and to our perceptions and their organization into thought systems. In the same manner he finds in our emotional consciousness nothing but the combination of emotional elements into the systems of sentiments and the creating of 'dispositions' that answer to this organization. The author endows the lowest form, in which instincts appear, with both perception and emotion. His justification for making the stimulation of every instinct perceptual is that the form must 'select' the sensation among competing elements, and that this selective attention implies perception. There is no discussion of this point, but there is also no adequate evidence either in ourselves or in the study of animal behavior for the proposition that susceptibility to one stimulus to the elimination of others implies perception. In fact the decisive ground seems to have been that we may assume that the same tracts of the brain are excited which we regard as necessary to cognition. In a word, for the author, selective stimulation which sets free an instinctive act must be perceptual, and the problem of the function of cognitive consciousness in the evolution of animal life is pushed quite to one side. If we assume, with

the functional psychologists, among whom Mr. McDougall classes himself, that the function of cognitive consciousness has been the solution of difficulties with which the lower animal cannot cope at all, or only by means of the gradual process of natural selection of accidentally successful reactions, this tying up of cognition to the afferent part of the act, simply as a necessary accompaniment, is an abandonment of the whole attempted explanation. Consciousness of a cognitive character must arise within the act to further its success, and not be a mere correlate of an afferent disturbance if it is to have a place in an evolutionary doctrine. In fact all the currents in the instinct run in one direction — from the afferent tract to the central; from this along two paths, to the vital organs, thus giving the nervous correlate of the emotions, and into the afferent tracts leading to motor discharge. There is no indication of the reflection of these different excitements back into each other, and yet the play back and forth of the response and stimulus processes is the whole nature of control, and it is from every point of view probable that the reflective type of consciousness arises in this process of interaction between the different phases of the act. Cognitive consciousness is not a mere characteristic of the sensuous phase of the act, but a derivative of the process by which the act develops through readjustment, in the presence of difficulties. It belongs to the act as a whole. Into sensation enters the motor character of the response, otherwise sense perception could never control reaction. When this control becomes conscious the sensing may well become perception. Without attempting to dogmatize upon the question, one may rest assured that the point at which perception appears must be determined by a doctrine of development that recognizes the functional value of consciousness in the entire act. The same situation obtains in regard to the emotions. The peculiar nature of the emotion lies in the fact that it belongs to the whole state of consciousness, that it reflects into the process of stimulation and furnishes the value content of the object that arises in the situation, that it is related to ongoing activity, but appears only when the activities have been checked. If cognitive consciousness is one phase of the readjustment tendencies to act, emotion is another — the other phase. If this statement is correct, there is no emotion that belongs to an instinct, any more than there is a perception which belongs to its afferent phase. The emotion as such appears only when the activity has been inhibited and a conscious presentation of the whole situation arises.¹

Again, whether this statement be accepted or not, the emotions must from the point of view of evolution be regarded as having a

¹Dewey, 'Theory of the Emotions,' *PSYCHOL. REV.*, I., 553; II., 13.

function in the development of conscious intelligence. They must be related to that situation which furnishes the *raison d'être* for higher consciousness, the situation of inhibition, to which the conscious readjustment of the form responds, making by its conscious nature a short cut through the tedious and bungling processes of natural selection. This function seems to be twofold, the one that of evaluation, the other that of communication.

This attack upon the problem of social psychology is very encouraging. It demonstrates at once that the act as a starting point is not only fortunate for this branch of psychology, but must be equally valuable for individual psychology, when the mechanics of the act and the mutual interrelations of its different phases have been more completely worked out.

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CUSTOM AND ETHICS.

A Study of the Influence of Custom on the Moral Judgment.

FRANK CHAPMAN SHARP. Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, 1908. Pp. 144. \$0.30.

This study is one that every student of ethics and of present social conditions will wish to read. Whether he agrees with the author as to methods of inquiry and interpretations of material or not he will be stimulated to consider whether the actual moral life of the present is as well known as writers on the subject are apt to assume. It is likely that many may not agree with the author as to just what significance is to be attached to the material, but the fundamental motive of the inquiry certainly commands assent. Whether the best method is the one here adopted or whether we use indirect methods such as examination of legislation, court procedure, voluntary organizations, political campaigns, business codes, drama, fiction, and other expressions of public opinion or public taste—no one can question the author's claim that we need to investigate the actual moral life about us.

The specific problem indicated by the title was approached by a questionnaire given out to two groups of students in the University of Wisconsin. One group of ninety-three was composed of forty-eight men and forty-five women from the College of Letters and Science; the second group comprised fifty men from the Short Course in Agriculture, none of whom had attended a high school more than two years, the great majority having had only an elementary country school education. The method of examination was to submit a series of casuistry questions for written answers and then to follow up the

inquiry by personal interviews. In general the inquiry aims to discover how far the moral judgments examined seem to be due to custom and how far they have some reasoned basis. In particular the two subordinate questions as to whether the judgments are mediate or immediate, and whether they do or do not fall back on some authority, are relied upon to throw light on the main question. If the judgments are immediate this in so far raises a presupposition of their derivation from custom; if on the other hand they rest on some reason that is forthcoming as soon as asked for, the presumption is that the judgment is not, or at least is not wholly, from custom. The results which emerge are summarized by Professor Sharp as follows: "Of the more than five hundred answers obtained from the 'Hill' students only eleven can urge even a *prima facie* claim to immediacy." "The examination of the members of the Short Course in Agriculture yielded precisely the same results — about fifteen may possibly be immediate, though again all or almost all leave the door open to classification as eudæmonistic." "As regards the influence of authority the only conclusion I am able to draw from these data is the absence of any evidence for the existence in these two groups of persons of moral judgments created by the mere presence of a foreign will. In other words, practically all gave a reason for their judgments and this reason in most cases was one based on welfare, either of those immediately concerned or of a larger whole.

Before considering the bearing of this on the question as to the influence of custom we need to note what alternatives the author proposes. He wishes to investigate the theory "that the prevalence of a uniform mode of behavior in a given society, especially if none of its members can remember a divergent mode as existing within its borders, is capable of creating the judgment that the conduct in question is a duty." This influence of custom, if there be any such thing, may be conceived to operate in one of three ways: (1) The mere fact that a certain mode of conduct is observed to be general generates in the mind of the individual the notion that it is obligatory. (2) The fact that a mode of conduct is general is taken by the individual as evidence that the majority (or all) wish it to be universal. This felt pressure of the wills of the many upon his will generates in him the conviction that the action is obligatory. (3) The individual though having moral conceptions of his own may yet in cases of conflict accept general usage as indicating the moral convictions of the majority, and thus as a more trustworthy guide than his individual judgment. Disregarding (1) as not to be taken seriously, the author holds that neither (2) the 'foreign pressure' theory, nor even (3) is supported by his tests.

One must certainly agree that certain statements of the custom theory will not stand either theoretic criticism or the test of facts. But as one who has committed himself to the doctrine that custom has a strong influence upon conduct at least, I feel bound to file caveats and raise questions with a view to requiring a consideration as to just what is implied by the facts brought out.

1. It is the explicit moral judgment of a 'cool hour,' or at least of detachment, and not the implicit judgments of actual conduct which the method examines. Professor Sharp considers this point (pp. 116 ff.), but I am not convinced that he gives it due weight. For example, if I interpret correctly the percentages on page 126, over half the students tested would approve giving an overdose of morphine to a patient hopelessly ill of a painful disease. I think it would be a safe guess that a far smaller proportion would actually do the act.

2. If one is asked to give a *reason* for his judgment, is it at all likely that he would allege either general custom or the 'pressure of other wills'? The average young person is not so averse to giving reasons on compulsion as was Falstaff, and if he has ever used such criteria as individual or social welfare for any act—and who has not?—will he not naturally fall back on this when explicitly challenged?

3. The heart of the matter seems to be the way in which custom would operate if it were operative at all. Would it be expected that any one really influenced to a sense of moral obligation by a group should consider himself acted on by a *foreign* will (*italics mine*)? It is the essence of our present view of group life that the member is one of the group, and therefore sharing in all the suggestions, the valuations, and the actions implied in the customs. Thus, as the author suggests, the farmers' boys value property strongly. It is characteristic of their class. A labor unionist's child has a detestation of a 'scab.' He could very likely give a reason if asked why. Nevertheless his judgment was probably due more to group influence than to individual reasoning.

4. The casuistry questions selected are many of them admirably adapted to stimulate 'mediation' and would hardly bring out the cases in which custom would be found as the controlling force. I should be interested in such inquiries as this, addressed to college students: Have your views as to the proper observance of Sunday changed at all since childhood? What were the grounds of your old views, and what are those for your present view?

5. Is sufficient prominence given to the marked difference between

the more sophisticated college students and the agriculture students in the matter of rigoristic and latitudinarian answers? The agriculture students are far more rigoristic. Professor Sharp believes that the explanation for this is to be found not in the influence of custom or the authority of the Bible, but "partly in the difference in education and average culture in the two classes, partly in the particular circumstances of their lives." Is not the 'difference in education' another way of spelling increased attention to the values of life on the one hand and to rational methods of procedure on the other? But both of these aspects of education would tend to replace custom. And as to the 'particular circumstances' I should incline to think that the social groups to which those questioned had belonged were more important than the physical conditions.

In conclusion, then, we should all agree that our explicit moral judgments tend to be reasoned. The present writer, however, believes that a large stratum of conduct is customary, in the sense that our approval is largely dependent on the current attitudes of our group. Who shall say that modes of women's dress, of dancing, of business or professional conduct, are approved or disapproved on purely reasoned bases, or that in our notion of what is decent or indecent, proper or improper (and these shade imperceptibly into right and wrong for the judgment of common sense) we can detach ourselves wholly from the group or class and form 'individual' valuations or judgments?

J. H. T.

LOYALTY.

The Philosophy of Loyalty. JOSIAH ROYCE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1908. Pp. xiii + 409. Price \$1.50.

Sub specie fidelitatis! To reduce the virtues to one has proved to many a fascinating task. Wisdom, pleasure, perfection, duty, love, benevolence, rationality, power, and other concepts have served in turn as such an ultimate. Each has a fair claim to stand for some valuable aspect of the moral life. But none has established itself as adequate to satisfy the complex demands of reflection and action, of reason and feeling, of order and progress, of individual development and social claim. The point of view from which Professor Royce paints his picture is one that enables him to bring out certain values strongly. And it scarcely needs to be said that the coloring, the light and shade, the detail that helps the central motive, are all handled with masterly skill. Professor Royce knows how to present his message to the wide public that is ready to welcome philosophy provided

it is not required to learn a new language at the same time. But as the picture claims not only to be *a* picture, but a picture from a point of view which is adequate for comprehending the whole duty of man it must be so considered.

Loyalty as a central principle has this in its favor at the outset: it derives from one of the fundamental elements in early morality. In its simpler forms loyalty to clan, or chief, to tribal brother or ancestral god, exhibits the capacity to pass beyond the bounds of a physical self and recognize a social bond and social claim. Loyalty to a cause, which is the type of loyalty that the author holds up as the fulfilling of the law, is a more impersonal phase of the same attitude. In thus de-personalizing the conception of loyalty the question is, What content do we substitute for the old? For, whereas there was but one chief or clan there are many 'causes.' To which shall I be loyal? Doubtless I cannot serve God and mammon; but are not mammon's servants as loyal as God's? The formula that is presented as a criterion for our choice here sounds at first as purely formal as, Do your duty. It is, 'Be loyal to loyalty.' This, however, is not ultimate. On the one hand it is traced back to a more specifically individual act; on the other, the conception of loyalty is given a new social content.

The individualistic answer to the question, which cause? is: "Decide as I, your conscience, the ideal expression of your whole personal nature, find best." "We are fallible but we can be decisive and faithful." It may go without challenge that decision is necessary for moral conduct, and that it is noble to be faithful to a well chosen cause. But on this subjective side of conduct is there no further word? Certainly we cannot demand of a principle that it shall make our choices, but should it not give instruction as to the method of making them? Professor Royce refers us to the self as unified by a purpose, the purpose of loyalty. "It is devoting the self to a cause that after all first makes it a rational and unified self," and conscience is the voice of such a self. But admitting the value of all this, is it not important to stress also the aspect of reflection, and especially of investigation by scientific methods, if man is to find his cause? For one I believe that the most hopeful sign of present day morality as we see it actually at work is this use of scientific method in place of the chaos, the subjectivism, or the fanaticism of the older morality. Faithfulness is one side, but actual moral progress demands that we do not lavish our service in pathetic devotion to the wrong cause.

We turn then to the social content that is given to the principle. Loyalty to loyalty means 'an unity with the unity of all human life'

(p. 126). "A cause means something that is conceived by its loyal servant as unifying the lives of various human beings into one life" (p. 252). Loyalty means unity. And there can be no question that unity is a true social note. None the less when we ask whether this is *the* note most needed, we must settle with an ambiguity.

A unity is at least theoretically conceivable along the lines of subordination worked out by Plato and cherished by many as the only possible type. But another more democratic conception is hovering in the horizon of some. It involves a remaking of human nature, it is true, but just this constitutes its lure. I do not mean to suggest that Professor Royce's conception of unity will not welcome this as a possible mode, but it can scarcely be said to demand it. And I doubt whether any formulation which does not make this a dominant note will strike the deepest chords of the European and American conscience of to-day. It is because of this prior demand that 'justice' is likely for some time to come to evoke a larger response than unity. We must have unity. Yes, but we will struggle for justice first. For no unity is permanent, and none is fully moral that does not include justice.

In his later chapters on 'Loyalty, Truth and Reality' and 'Loyalty and Religion' the author devotes himself to the correction of the pragmatists, and with a neat turn borrows a phrase in which to frame his final definition of loyalty: *Loyalty is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being.*

J. H. T.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISING.

The Psychology of Advertising. WALTER DILL SCOTT. Boston, 1908. Pp. 269.

While every one has been vaguely aware that there is a great deal of 'psychology' involved in advertising, Professor Scott deserves the credit of being the first to work out clearly and definitely the application of psychological principles to this field of activity. This work treats specifically of memory, the feelings and emotions, sympathy, instinct, suggestion, the will, habit, and attention, showing with what principles in each of these processes the advertiser has to reckon, and in what way. His points are illustrated by familiar advertisements taken chiefly from the magazines. He also gives the results of investigations which throw light upon the amount of time that the average reader of a magazine devotes to looking over its advertisements, the

attention-value of small and large spaces, the employment of different kinds of type, and the arrangement of display type and cuts so as to prove most effective, and similar practical questions in which psychological principles are involved. He quotes freely from Professor James' works, and follows his general point of view in the theoretical psychology employed.

Perhaps the detail of chief interest to the social psychologist is the discussion of the manner in which the advertiser should appeal to instincts affecting the social self. Every one wishes to be regarded as belonging to a desirable social class, and one of the advertiser's problems is to make his goods appear to be in demand by this preferred set. A millinery cut representing hats worn by refined and well-dressed ladies, and the advertisement of a flesh-reducing remedy adorned by a cut of a refined lady, well gowned but obviously embarrassed by her excessive embonpoint, are effective in their appeal, while an awkward peasant lout holding a shoe in his hand, and a vulgar fat woman dressed in plaids are ineffective.

The discussion of food advertisements is interesting. People decidedly prefer turkey to pork, and quail to chicken, although they are actually unable when blindfolded to distinguish these foods by differences in taste. The preference is a matter of association. Turkey is rarer than pork, and suggests Thanksgiving and other pleasant scenes, while quail is associated with the pleasures of the chase, the open fields, pure air, and exhilarating sport, and is usually daintily garnished when brought upon the table. Consequently the man who has food stuffs to sell needs to create a glamor over them analogous to that which turkey and quail now enjoy. This, Professor Scott thinks, can be done by the right kind of advertising. The dainty, ethereal ladies appearing in the advertisements of Nabisco wafers are effective in associating this food with daintiness and elegance, while a promiscuous abundance of fruit appearing in a Wheatlet advertisement is repulsive. Similarly, several toilet articles are commended by the purity and daintiness suggested in advertisements, and a certain brand of pianos is effectively advertised by cuts in which the piano appears in parlors furnished in great elegance and good taste.

The book closes with the report of a questionnaire embodying the attitude toward the daily newspapers of two thousand leading Chicago business and professional men. These show a profound lack of confidence in the reliability of newspapers in regard to news, which Professor Scott thinks seriously affects their value as advertising mediums. In this connection he says: "The hope for relief from sensational

journalism is to be found only in the discovery of the fact that a very influential class of business men cannot be influenced by advertisements appearing in sensational publications."

As will have been observed, Professor Scott thinks that the most important process for the advertiser to employ is suggestion, and that appeals to the reason are only of supplementary value. To be sure, in this book he considers chiefly the general run of magazine advertisements, which can hope for only very cursory attention, and probably he would admit that the rational element enters more largely into circular letters, and into advertisements of investments and of expensive articles of consumption. The reviewer is convinced by Professor Scott's book that mere repeated suggestion by advertisements influences all of us in our purchases more than most of us are aware; but he would like to ask if there may not after all be a more or less reflective attitude implied even in our apparent openness to suggestion from magazine advertisements. We have found advertised articles satisfactory in the past. An advertised article is probably a good article; it costs money to advertise, and business men are not likely to go to a large outlay to advertise trashy articles which no one will buy a second time. Consequently it seems wise to buy an article with whose name one has become familiar through advertisements rather than an article of which one has no information except the dubious recommendation of the sales person who perhaps receives an extra commission upon sales of the less known articles.

The book throughout is extremely suggestive. It demonstrates that psychology has fully as close an application to the field of advertising as to that of education, and suggests the probability that psychology can be applied with equal profit to salesmanship, the display of merchandise, soliciting — in fact, to everything which has to do with placing goods upon the market and effecting their sale. If such proves to be the case, may we not expect that in the not far distant future applied psychology will be as prominent a feature in the commercial courses of our universities as it is in educational courses to-day?

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

W. K. WRIGHT.

SOCIAL HEREDITY.

Heredity and Selection in Sociology. GEORGE CHATTERTON-HILL.
London, Black; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1907. Pp.
xxx + 571.

Of the three parts into which this book is divided, Part I., The Theory of Descent, deals with biological material and conceptions.

Part II., Social Pathology, considers especially suicide, insanity, alcoholism and syphilis. The rapid increase in the first three argues a relaxation of social restraints. In the case of suicide this (rather than suggestion or imitation) is indicated by the comparative frequency of suicide in Protestant as versus Catholic districts, and by the greater prevalence among the unmarried or widowed as compared with the married, especially as compared with those who have children. The 'inverse selection' due to militarism, to the later marriages of the educated classes, and to the smaller families of those in better economic circumstances, is also considered as a factor constantly at work against social welfare. Conflict and selection are regarded as necessary methods of progress; ethical influences are of slight importance in shaping the course of evolution. The general conclusion is that our present social polity is not favorable to progress. Part III., The Actual Conditions of Social Solution, examines 'The Bankruptcy of Liberalism' meaning by 'Liberalism' popular government carrying out two ideas 'the rights of the individual as an individual and the unrestricted competition between individuals.' These two are irreconcilable, and in fact modern capitalism pays no attention to the rights of the weaker. On the other hand, socialism although endeavoring to recognize the value of the individual life rejects conflict, which is a necessity for expansion of life. The author finds the only salvation for society in a supra rational sanction — religion. There is much stimulating discussion, but the author does not make it clear just how he proposes to get society to adopt a 'supra rational' sanction for the end of its own preservation. If nature is 'mechanical' and social evolution has no 'moral aim' religion seems to have little basis in reality. But on the other hand if a belief in it is necessary for social integration and those societies will be eliminated which do not possess it, we seem reduced to Voltaire's standpoint with a slight variation: There is no God, but it is necessary to invent one.

J. H. T.

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

La philosophie sociale de Renouvier. ROGER PICARD. Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1908. Pp. 344.

Sixty-one years of literary activity are not often given to one man, but Renouvier's first publication appeared in 1842 and his last in 1903. It is a service to give so lucid and condensed a statement of the social philosophy embodied in the two volumes of the *Science de la Morale* and the four of the *Philosophie Analytique de l'Histoire*. Neo-

criticism in social philosophy meant the assertion of the rôle of the free individual in history as over against the 'stages' of Comte or the mechanism of Buckle. But it meant also the emphasis upon justice as the fundamental moral category in opposition to that form of individualism which as held by the classical economists permitted exploitation of the weak by the strong under the guise of liberty, and with the professed purpose of securing the greatest happiness.

Pessimisme, Féminisme, Moralisme. CAMILLE BOS. Paris, Alcan, 1907. Pp. vi + 173.

Three types of pessimism — pagan, christian (Pascal), and atheistic (Léopardi) are sketched. The movement for 'equality' of women with men is criticized from the standpoint of science and morals. Under 'Moralism' Maeterlinck's *Wisdom and Destiny*, the notion of parenthood, and the mutations of love between the sexes in ancient and modern times. The book is sketchy and can scarcely claim scientific merit.

Le troisième sexe. Les homosexuels de Berlin. MAGNUS HIRSCHFELD. Paris, Rousset, 1908. Pp. 103.

This monograph, written apparently three years ago, is by a physician who in the practice of his profession had occasion to know many of the "uranians" of Berlin, and has made a sympathetic sketch of their abnormal attachments. The author estimates that there may be 50,000 in that city, so constituted as to experience these more or less sentimental attachments for their own sex only. Certain clubs — literary, musical, etc. — are composed exclusively or largely of such members. Such gatherings are described, but there is little attempt at psychological analysis.

J. H. T.

Vie religieuse et vie économique. RENÉ MAUNIER. *Revue internationale de sociologie*, 1907, XV., 841-880; 1908, XVI., 16-36, 88-106.

M. Maunier believes that economic functions have developed in primitive life in very close conjunction with, and dependence upon religious beliefs and practises. This is evident in the rise of division of labor, to which, as an economic factor of central importance, he devotes his chief attention. He shows that division of labor does not owe its origin to rational choice and calculation upon the part of individuals — as the psychology of the classical school of economists

has led us to suppose — but upon the social will of tribes, determined by a social logic that is collective and emotional.

Division of labor first appears in primitive races with the assignment of distinct tasks to each sex. At first the men hunt and fish, while the women gather fruits, and often build the huts and till the soil in rudimentary fashion. Later, men build the huts and cultivate the soil, while the work of the women becomes more domestic in character. In all cases each sex is given very specific tasks to do, which are prohibited to the other sex under severe penalties. The ground for this sharp division of labor between the sexes is religious, resting upon taboos probably due to the sanctity attached to blood, especially menstrual blood. This flow of blood makes woman sacred, bringing her into peculiarly close relationship to the totems, and results in the assignment to her of carefully allotted tasks which thereby become taboo to the men.

So long as social intercourse is restricted to a single clan, sexual division of labor alone exists. But when society is enlarged by the fusion of clans, a new division of labor between the clans appears, based upon totemic conceptions, and the sexual division becomes less important, and largely disappears.

When clans have crystallized into castes the dependence of economic specialization upon religious beliefs is clearly marked. At the start we here have an original caste in which the functions of king, priest, and magician are often combined. These are later separated into distinct castes which are protected by taboos, and which perform numerous economic as well as religious functions. Still later the smith and merchant castes become separated from these, and are likewise protected by taboos. Professions are the exclusive monopolies of distinct castes, upon whose members they are obligatory; and the grounds of monopoly and obligation are originally religious, and only later economic.

Du rôle des idées dans l'évolution des sociétés. S. JANKELEVITCH.

Revue philosophique, 1908, XXXIII., 256-280.

The meaning of history must be sought in the development of ideas; for while material factors are important in the determination of events, they are inadequate for the explanation of them. Primitive peoples, indeed, adapt themselves to their environment in almost reflex fashion; but with the commencement of civilization man begins to reflect, to criticize, and to form general ideas. In civilized life we therefore find a conflict and mutual adjustment between ideas and facts.

Comte's theory of the three stages is found inadequate for explaining the causes of social evolution; science is not the cause but the product of social evolution, and this latter can be traced with equal distinctness in the evolution of any other order of facts, *e. g.*, the position of woman, peacefulness, recognition of the worth of human personality. Nietzsche and others who have thought of social evolution as a mere recurrence have failed to abstract ideas from facts, and to discriminate between ideas which are only survivals, or merely consequences of the friction between new and old, and ideas which actually condition the present and determine the future.

There are 'organic ideas,' so to speak, immanent in human social evolution. Civilized societies are distinguishable not so much by the manner as by the degree in which they realize these principles. Among savages these ideas have not yet risen above the level of consciousness; among civilized peoples the *élan social* (imitating Bergson's *l'élan vital*) is active in varying degrees. It is never distributed equally among all classes in any given society. The vast majority in any society are like savages in their blind devotion to material facts, traditions, and habits, and in the inertia which they oppose to progressive ideas. Progress is only secured by the action of the *élite*, men of strong personality who succeed in overcoming the inertia of the masses, and so continue the course of social evolution and really make history.

The Psychology of Mysticism. E. BOUTROUX. Internat. Journal of Ethics, 1908, XVIII., 182-195.

M. Boutroux's address, of which this is an excellent translation, is perhaps the clearest brief statement of the points involved in the psychology of mysticism that has been made. Six phases of the mystic's procedure are distinguished. The mystic has put a special emphasis on *introspection*, through which he believes that he can penetrate beneath the ordinary facts of consciousness to the inmost depths of his own being, and on *experiment*, through which the mystic, given certain abstract ideas of love, beauty, goodness, God, makes them emotionally his own, and so nourishes the true life of the soul. Viewed from the standpoint of the objective psychologist, the phenomena of mysticism must be reduced to auto-suggestion and mono-ideism. But auto-suggestion and mono-ideism are not necessarily abnormal or pathological. The man of genius and every man of action manifests them. All depends upon the moral and social value of the idea upon which the mystic concentrates his whole attention. Mysticism does not seem necessarily to involve asceticism, but suggests possibilities of

large social value in working for the solidarity of humanity without sacrificing individual, family, and national values. It therefore deserves the serious study both of scientists and humanitarians.

The Sources of the Mystical Revelation. GEORGE A. COE. *Hibbert Journal*, 1908, VI., 359-372.

The main body of the article is an argument to show that no proof for the ontological validity of the mystic's experiences can be derived either (1) from the generic similarity in content of mystic experiences, as James has argued, or (2) from evidence for an affective adjustment to a larger reality not open to our cognitive processes, as Starbuck and Pratt maintain. On the other hand, Professor Coe concludes that 'the mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his nonmystical neighbor does, namely, through tradition and instruction, autosuggestion grown habitual, and reflective analysis.' The ideas of the mystic are traceable to social inheritance and are 'part and parcel of the general historical movement of religious life.' This, however, does not dispose of mysticism wholly. "For, though we trace the ideas of the mystic to some social tradition that he has imbibed, the tradition as a whole needs to be accounted for." And though 'we may even go so far as to say that all real religion consists ultimately in some mystical practice,' our present need is for 'a deeper analysis of the functions of the will in religion,' and this analysis will 'lead us toward a faith-philosophy and away from mysticism.'

W. K. WRIGHT.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

L'Esprit de l'Allemagne moderne. PAUL ELTZTASCHÉ. *La Vie Contemporaine*, 1908. April special number.

The great commercial and industrial advance in Germany has been accompanied by parallel interest in education, although artistic culture has suffered. In morals there has been departure from old time simplicity; but, on the other hand, activity, energy, occupation, have gained new value. Solidarity has increased, and there has been an extraordinary development of active altruism.

J. H. T.

L'Idéal moderne. PAUL GAULTIER. Paris, Hachette et Cie., 1908. Pp. viii + 358.

There is little of psychological interest in this book. It attempts a 'higher synthesis' of the current antinomies of liberty and economic

inequality, of individualism and socialism, of science and religion. In attempting to get to a level in which differences will be overcome, the author succeeds in eliminating most that is positive and characteristic in the opposing movements.

G. H. MEAD.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

DISCUSSION.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEELING AND ATTENTION.

I think that the printing of the two following passages, side by side, will carry its own moral. The first passage occurs in Professor Meyer's paper on the nervous correlate of attention (*PSYCHOL. REVIEW*, XV., 1908, 359).

Meanwhile Titchener's *Psychology of Feeling and Attention* has been made public. If there is anyone whom the historical part of my previous article did not convince that the traditional methods of investigating feeling — no matter whether experimental or otherwise — have reached a *cul-de-sac*, Titchener's book will convince him. The author's conclusion is decidedly pessimistic, one might even say desperate. He confesses "to a feeling of unpleasantness, tension and depression. We know so very little of the subject of these Lectures, and the work that we have found to do will take so long in the doing!" This will hardly encourage any student to devote himself to an investigation of feeling. . . .

The conclusion of my book (pp. 316 f.) is this:

I finished writing the last paragraph with a feeling compounded, in Wundtian terms, of pleasantness, relaxation and tranquillisation. We set out from uncertainty and chaos; and we have at least achieved a definite point of view, and have laid out a programme of experimental work for the future. Unfortunately, affective processes move between opposites: and that first feeling . . . soon gave way to a feeling of unpleasantness, tension and depression. We know so very little of the subject of these Lectures, and the work we have found to do will take so long in the doing! But feelings, again, are subject to *Abstumpfung*, show the phenomena of adaptation; and the feeling of depression passed as the feeling of relief had passed before it. The professional attitude came to its rights. And that attitude, in the case of the experimental psychologist, is . . . an attitude of patient confidence. We must be patient, because of all the objects of human enquiry mind is the most baffling and the most complex. . . . But we may have absolute confidence in our method, because the method has proved itself in the past; it has done far more for psychology than is generally acknowledged, far more even than is recognized in the ordinary text-book of psychology. . . . There is not the slightest doubt that the patient application of the experimental method will presently solve the problems of feeling and attention.

E. B. TITCHENER.

BOOKS RECEIVED FROM NOVEMBER 5 TO
DECEMBER 5.

- Über Theodor 'Lipps' Versuch einer Theorie des Willens.* J. PIKLER. Leipzig, Barth, 1908. Pp. 50.
- Zwei Vorträge über dynamische Psychologie.* J. PIKLER. Leipzig, Barth, 1908. Pp. 24.
- A Handbook of Suggestive Therapeutics, Applied Hypnotism, Psychic Science.* H. S. MUNRO. St. Louis, Mosby, 1908. Pp. iv + 360.
- Heredity.* J. A. THOMSON. Science Series. New York and London, Putnams, 1908. Pp. xvi + 605.
- Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics.* Ed. by JAMES HASTINGS. Vol. I. A — Art. New York, Scribners; Edinburgh, Black 1908. Pp. xxii + 903.
- Textbook of School and Class Management, Theory and Practice.* F. ARNOLD. New York, Macmillans, 1908. Pp. xxii + 409.
- Human Nature in Politics.* G. WALLAS. London, Constable, 1908. Pp. xvi + 302. 6s.
- Report of the Commissioner of Education (1907).* Vol. I. Washington, Gov. Print. Office, 1908. Pp. vii + 522.
- Das Gedächtniss. Die Ergebnisse der experimentellen Psychologie und ihre Anwendung in Unterricht und Erziehung.* M. OFFNER. Berlin, Reuther u. Reichard, 1909 (for 1908). Pp. x + 239. M. 3.
- Bulletijn van het Algemeen Paedologisch Gezelschap (1907).* Brugge, Witteryck, 1908. Pp. 118.
- Les Problèmes de la Science et la Logique.* F. ENRIQUES. Tr. from the Italian by J. DUBOIS. Paris, Alcan, 1909 (for 1908). Pp. 256. 3 fr. 50.
- Proceedings of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago Meeting, 1907-8.* The Secretary, 1908. Pp. 378.
- L'Adolescence; Etudes de Psychologie et de Pédagogie.* G. COMPAYRÉ. Paris, Alcan, 1909 (for 1908). Pp. 196. 2 fr. 50.
- The Miller and the Toad.* RICHARD CLIFTON. Boston, Sherman, French & Co., 1909. Pp. 220. \$1.20 net.
- Report of President Butler to the Trustees of Columbia University.* November 2, 1908. (Advance Sheets.) Pp. 56.

NOTES AND NEWS.

THE autumn meeting of the North Central Psychological Association was held in Chicago on November 28. About seventy-five persons attended the sessions, which were held in the new Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago. The following papers were read: 'The Moral Value of the Esthetic Experience,' E. L. NORTON (Illinois); 'Consciousness as Object of Cognition,' B. C. EWER (Northwestern); 'Some Results of an Investigation of Memory for Absolute Pitch,' J. W. BAIRD (Illinois); 'The Transference of Practice,' W. F. DEARBORN (Wisconsin); 'The Psycho-Galvanic Reflex,' D. W. STARCH (Wisconsin); 'A Supplementary Report on the Psychology of Learning a Language,' IRVING KING (Michigan); 'The Possibility of Binocular Vision in Certain Animals,' KARL T. WAUGH (Chicago); 'The Mystical as a Psychological Concept,' GEORGE A. COE (Northwestern); 'Note on the Evolution of the Religious Consciousness,' HENRY W. WRIGHT (Lake Forest); 'Primitive Animism,' EDWARD S. AMES (Chicago); 'Social Consciousness,' GEORGE H. MEAD (Chicago); 'The Psychological Machinery of the Concept of Infinity,' ROWLAND HAYNES (Minnesota).

MOST of the figures in Meyer's *Introduction to the Mechanics of the Inner Ear* have been reproduced in lantern slides (twenty-three) made from the original drawings. The figures have been conveniently grouped together, two or more on one slide, as much as possible. Five slides have also been made from the original drawings of the figures illustrating nervous architecture and function, in the *PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW*, XV. (4, 5). Any or all of these slides may be obtained (30 cts. each) by addressing Professor Max Meyer, University of Missouri.

PROFESSOR W. B. PILLSBURY, of the University of Michigan, is lecturing at Columbia University during the present term, in place of Professor Cattell, who is absent on leave.

THE present number of the *BULLETIN*, dealing especially with social psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor J. H. Tufts.

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